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Foreign Policy and Globalization Theory: The Case of Israel 
Introduction 
Although the term ‘globalization’ has been in academic use since the 1970s, serious attempts to theorize 
it began only in the late 1980s. In their work, Global Transformations, Held et al. bring together the 
vast literature on globalization, laying the foundations for globalization theory (GT) and providing the 
tools for examining empirically the globalization of multiple activities: from politics and organized 
violence, to finance, trade, production and migration, through culture and environmental degradation.1 
Held et al.’s appraisal of the hyper-globalist, global-sceptic, and transformationalist theses defined the 
contours of the first great debate on globalization, placing the transformationalist thesis at the forefront 
of what emerged as GT.2 Uniting the huge literature comprising GT are two broad assumptions. First, 
that globalization is producing a fundamental shift in the spatio-temporal constitution of human 
societies. Second, that this shift is so profound that, in retrospect, it has revealed a basic lacuna in the 
classical, territorially-grounded tradition of social theory, thereby entailing development of a new, post-
classical, social theory, in which the categories of space and time assume the central, explanatory role.3 
 
Following the publication of Global Transformations another great debate on globalization is 
underway, much of it centring on the direction that GT should take. Authors, such as Rosenberg (2005), 
argue that GT is fundamentally flawed,4 hence, the way forward is to perform a post-mortem, to expose 
its ‘follies’ and draw lessons from this exposure. Others, however, acknowledge that the debate on 
globalization has generated a useful and insightful body of literature, but are resistant to attempts to turn 
it into a ‘theory’.5 This reluctance to theorize, and Rosenberg’s dismissal of GT, are rejected by Scholte 
(2005), Albert (2007), Robertson (2009), and by Held and colleagues’ ongoing work. Nevertheless, 
they concede that GT faces a real challenge: how to develop beyond the formulations generated by the 
first great debate on globalization.6   
 2 
In this vein this article will focus on what appears to be a significant lacuna in GT. Examination of what 
appear to be the best-known works on and forums for globalization reveals that foreign policy7—the 
sum of the external relations undertaken by an independent actor (usually a state) in international 
relations—has been virtually excluded from GT.8 Similarly, scholars of international relations (IR) 
theory specializing in foreign policy usually exclude GT from their matrix. For instance, Smith et al.’s 
and Hudson’s most recent studies of the state of the art in foreign policy analysis (FPA) completely 
ignore globalization and GT,9 while Hill argues that existing transnational formulations in FPA are 
better equipped than GT to examine issues that are of common concern to these literatures.10 And 
Webber and Smith, embrace the notion of globalization and explore its implications for FPA, but do not 
consider the reverse position.11 
 
The omission from GT of foreign policy—conceived as an activity that possesses a relative autonomy, 
which may derive from the role of the decision-makers, bureaucratic politics or the state itself12—seems 
problematic. Foreign policy is usually seen as a ‘boundary’ activity, at the interface between the 
domestic and the external spheres. While these spheres have never been completely separate, the 
boundary between them seems to have become more porous as a result of globalization, which is 
defined here for reasons that will become clearer as the argument unfolds as follows: a multi 
dimensional contested process that involves an increasing embedding of political, military, economic, 
social and cultural activities in politically unified (quasi) global spheres of activity.  
 
The manifestations are multiple. For example, since the end of the Second World War, states have 
become gradually more embedded in a plethora of global political institutions and military 
organizations; ‘national’ economies are increasingly implanted into global economic arenas such as 
trade and finance; domestic and global effects are increasingly interwoven. Does this mean that the 
boundary between the domestic and the external spheres is blurring to such a degree that foreign policy 
is being extinguished and rendered redundant in a globalizing age? Or, in a world that continues to be 
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divided by political borders into states and societies that need to deal with ‘foreignness’, are such 
developments generating a precisely opposite effect: making foreign policy ever more significant, in 
terms of determining the scope, nature and impact of globalization.  
 
Arguably, then, the relationship between foreign policy and globalization might have significant 
implications for the subject matter of international relations. In this light, the gap in contemporary IR 
theory, framed by the conceptual neglect of foreign policy by GT, would seem significant. This paper 
does not pretend to fill this void. Rather, it aims to initiate a debate, based on what is termed here the 
synergistic transformationalist approach (STA), on what including foreign policy in GT might entail. 
To this end, the first section of the article clusters recent works on globalization within IR, that critique 
the leading approaches comprising GT: the hyper-globalist and transformationalist theses.13 This 
critique is geared towards examining three issues: why foreign policy has hitherto been overlooked by 
contemporary GT; exposing the problems this omission might generate and; address these problems by 
exploring how STA enables GT to incorporate foreign policy. The second section of the article, which 
is informed by STA, examines Israeli foreign policy towards the PLO from 1973 to 1988.  The aim is to 
use the case of Israel heuristically, to identify specific areas where incorporating foreign policy into GT 
may better our understanding of foreign policy, globalization, and the relationship between them.  
 
A note on methodology 
 
The methodology of one case study for theory development, is employed for two reasons. First, the new 
debate on globalization is exciting, fruitful and provocative, but, to date, has focused almost exclusively 
on meta-theory and theory. There are almost no attempts to use case studies for theory development, 
despite the demonstrated usefulness of this methodology for examining complex interaction effects, 
particularly when the phenomena being studied—such as foreign policy—are difficult to measure. 
Furthermore, whilst deductive methods are useful to develop new theories or fill gaps in the existing 
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theory, case studies can be used to test deductive theories and identify new causal variables—such as 
foreign policy and the causal mechanisms it generates—whose effects are well known from other 
research.14 Therefore, Israel is used as a case study for theory development in order to complement the 
advances achieved by the deductive methodology behind current theoretical and meta-theoretical 
debates underpinning GT. Second, the somewhat underdeveloped state of theoretical reflection on 
foreign policy in the context of GT, does not warrant full, comparative study. The study of a so-called 
‘heuristic case’, however, should ‘stimulate the imagination toward discerning important general 
problems and possible theoretical solutions’.15  
 
However, why choose Israel-PLO relations as the case study? After all, the international,16 territorial-
religious,17 political,18 and military19 factors underpinning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, might seem to 
render Israeli foreign policy towards the PLO during the Cold War as disconnected from 
globalization.20 Furthermore, the conditions identified by GT as necessary for inducing and reproducing 
globalization—spatio-temporal compression and/or integration in the world economy—did not exist in 
Israel during this period.21 Hence, with one notable exception,22 the interface between globalization, the 
Cold War and foreign policy is absent from accounts of the globalization of Israel. Informed primarily 
by the neo-Marxist and transformationalist strands of GT, the majority of the literature identifies the 
1980s as the key period of the interfacing between globalization and Israeli foreign policy towards the 
PLO. Accounting for this is the confluence of Israel’s socio-economic liberalization, its exposure to the 
revolution in information technologies, and the ebbing of the Cold War.23  
 
Seemingly, then, exhibiting extreme disconnectedness from globalization, Israeli foreign policy towards 
the PLO between 1973 and 1988 appears a tough case to justify for exploring the feasibility and 
desirability of incorporating foreign policy into GT. However, it is precisely this seeming disconnection 
that renders the case of Israel a useful heuristic tool. If this study can show that foreign policy played a 
significant part in Israel’s globalization then, arguably, it should be expected to play an even greater 
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role in cases where the interlink between globalization and foreign policy is more strait forward. In 
addition, as current formulations of GT do not account for Israel’s during this period, arguably it is 
possible to ‘isolate’ foreign policy, highlighting its hitherto unexposed roles in the context of 
globalization.  
 
Of course, the sceptical reader might challenge this methodological claim, asserting that, since its 
establishment, Israel has been affected by globalization in being a settler-colonial or settler-immigrant 
society whose population comes from across Europe, the Middle East and North Africa; in being 
established in large measure through the financial and diplomatic support of great powers; and in being 
shaped in part by its interaction with the Jewish Diaspora and capital flows. While readily 
acknowledging the impact of these external factors, I argue that they constitute not globalization, but 
rather international/transnational relations. 
 
Another objection to choosing Israel’s foreign policy towards the PLO might stem from the fact that 
Israel did not recognize the organization during the 1973-1988 period. This objection seems 
problematic; for it would imply that territorial transnational actors (TNA) —distinguished by their 
seeking for some sort of territorial base such as a state e.g., the PLO, Hizballah, Hamas, the Workers 
Party of Kurdistan— which are not recognized by states cannot be accounted for in terms of foreign 
policy. However, as Hill and others have shown, territorial TNAs are ‘well-organized politico-military 
organizations, which pursue de facto foreign policies in pursuit of clear goals’. This makes them 
formidable antagonists of states, who’s actions towards these TNAs can usefully be accounted for in 
terms of foreign policy.24  
 
Set in this context, examining Israeli actions towards the PLO through the prism of foreign policy 
would seem useful. From 1967 onwards, although not a state, the PLO enjoyed a significant degree of 
autonomy within the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Middle East’s international regional 
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system. The PLO pursued diplomatic activity by establishing relations with Arab states, members of the 
non-aligned movement, the USSR and some of its clients. In addition, particularly up to the late 1980s, 
the PLO’s military activity relied on cross border operations and military attacks in Israel and beyond 
the Middle East. Thus, the organization’s core activities towards Israel fall squarely within the realm of 
foreign policy.25  
 
Bringing foreign policy into GT 
This section focuses on those authors who can be described as neo-Weberian historical sociologists of 
IR, but I also include the work of Ian Clark, whose study of globalization shares many neo-Weberian 
assumptions despite him not being associated with this group generally.26 Converging around a 
threefold critique of the hyper-globalist and transformationalist theses, this literature lays the ground for 
what is described above as the STA approach to globalization. The first charge is that the 
transformationalist and hyper-globalist theses attribute ontological primacy respectively to spatio-
temporal and economic elements, in the conceptualization of globalization and its causes. 
Correspondingly, foreign policy emerges as subordinated in some essential way to the logic prescribed 
by the economic and spatio-temporal processes generated by globalization. In ontological terms, this 
formulation seems problematic. It implies that most political action by governments, that is not aimed at 
harnessing globalization, is doomed to failure. It suggests also that traditional foreign policy, with its 
tendency to assume the primacy of the political, is barely relevant. Thus, the key theses comprising GT 
are fatalistic about the prospects of the political management of globalization, underestimating the 
degree of choice open to governments.27  
 
STA, on the other hand, in using a neo-Weberian ontology, considers globalization as a multi-centric, 
multidimensional and dialectical process in which political and military factors alongside other 
elements—economic, technological, ecological social, etc.—are constitutive of globalization. This neo-
 7 
Weberian ontology, by denying primacy to any one element, allows foreign policy to be conceived of as 
one among several constituents of globalization.28  
 
A second criticism concerns the conceptualization of the relationship between globalization and the 
state. The hyper-globalist thesis suggests that globalization is constructing new forms of social 
organizations that are supplanting, or will eventually supplant, nation-states as the primary economic 
and political units of world society.29 The transformationalist thesis, in turn, suggests that, in 
reorganizing time and space, globalization is redefining the territorial basis underpinning the political 
order of the sovereign nation-state, and its corresponding Westphalian international order, compelling 
states to transform and adapt.30 Thus, the hyper-globalist and transformationalist theses perceive the 
state as external and counter-positioned to contemporary globalization.31  
 
This conceptualization is resisted by STA. Shaw, for instance, argues that ‘globalization does not 
undermine the state but includes the transformation of state forms. It is both predicated on and produces 
such transformations’.32 This claim encapsulates how STA would perceive globalization-state relations; 
globalization is both predicated on, and produces transformations within the state, in a relationship that 
renders the two mutually constitutive.33 This conceptualization is pertinent to our discussion, for most 
accounts of foreign policy recognize that it is driven centrally by the state.34 Correspondingly, in 
considering the relationship between globalization and the state to be mutually constitutive, STA allows 
for the conceptualization of foreign policy and globalization in similar terms. In contrast, by conceiving 
globalization-state relations in antagonistic terms, the hyper-globalist and transformationalist theses 
render foreign policy as external and counter-positioned to globalization.  
 
The third critique levelled by STA at the hyper-globalist and transformationalist theses concerns their 
conceptualization of the relationship between international politics—understood as the interactions 
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between state actors across state boundaries that have a specific political content and character—and 
globalization. The hyper-globalist and transformationalist theses converge around the assumption that, 
at some historical junctures, most notably the late 19th century, globalization and international politics 
were mutually constitutive. For instance, Held et al. argue that ‘the rapidly developing empires of 
Britain and of other European states were the most powerful agents of globalization’.35 However, 
globalization theorists suggest that international politics and globalization after the age of empire are at 
odds, as the economic and spatio-temporal transformations globalization generates corrode the current 
territorially-based international system of states. Thus, Rosenau argues that globalization ‘allows 
peoples, information, norms, practices, and institutions, to move about oblivious to or despite 
boundaries’.36 Held et al. contend that contemporary ‘non-territorial’ globalization generates a 
transformation replacing the current Westphalian international order with a multi-layered system of 
global governance, in which sub-state, inter-state, supra-state and private governance bodies operate 
simultaneously, beyond the confines of states.37 In these accounts, international politics (after the age of 
empire), predicated on the territorially-based international system of states, is rendered an element 
constraining globalization—measured in terms of the expansion of global markets or the rise in the 
extent, intensity and velocity of transnational relations.38  
 
STA, however, conceives of international politics since the age of empire,39 through the Cold War, to 
the global war on terror (GWoT),40 as contributing to globalization and fragmentation. I substantiate 
this claim by examining how STA conceives of the relationship between globalization and the Cold 
War and the role in it of foreign policy. Clark, while readily accepting the fragmenting effects of the 
inter-systemic dimension of the Cold War, focuses on the connection between the intra-systemic 
dynamics of the conflict and the development of contemporary globalization. The thrust of his argument 
is that contemporary globalization emerged out of the internal political-military-economic design of the 
‘West’.41 Shaw explores this further, arguing that the key dynamic is the emergence of the ‘Western 
bloc-state’ following the end of the Second World War and the start of the Cold War. The Western 
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bloc-state consisted of a ‘massive institutionally complex and messy agglomeration’ that centred on 
North America, Western Europe, Japan and Australia. As the Cold War intensified, the Western Bloc-
State extended its writ to Latin America, parts of the Middle East, parts of Asia, and much of Africa’.42 
In this sense it was more global than Western.43  
 
While readily acknowledging the crucial importance of the Cold War’s inter-systemic rivalry, and its 
violent eruptions, the significance of Shaw’s and Clark’s accounts for our discussion lies elsewhere. 
Both authors highlight how, after 1945, a quasi global unified political sphere replaced the military—
political fracturing of the globe that characterized the age of empire. Use of the phrase ‘quasi global 
unified political sphere’ is not to suggest that this realm was free of political pressures. For instance, the 
mere fact that a plurality of states comprised this sphere, generated some frictions, e.g. differences in 
the ‘West’ over the US’s war with Vietnam, and its involvement in the Arab-Israeli 1973 war.  
 
Nevertheless, this quasi global sphere is regarded as being politically unified in two senses. First, states 
comprising the quasi global unified political sphere depend on it as a centre of violence44 and, therefore, 
cease to be what Giddens terms ‘border power containers’. This term indicates that the borders of states 
are not mere administrative divisions; they are also, potentially at least, lines along which violence 
might erupt. In this sense, states typically are discrete autonomous centres of political-military power 
whose conflicts can erupt in violence.45 Second, the coordination of authority and the use of political 
force has been pooled within the raft of established international politically integrated institutions46, bi-
lateral and multi-lateral alliances within the Western complex. Jointly, these mechanisms are seen to 
play a crucial role in the rise of this ‘global layer of state’.47 In fact, Shaw and others go further to argue 
that what emerged was a global state/bloc state with many governments.48   
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This claim, however, seems flawed, particularly since Shaw predicates his notion of the bloc-state on 
Mann’s institutional definition of the state. A central tenet of Mann’s conceptualization is that states 
‘bind’ territories by exerting either despotic or infrastructural power.49 Shaw does not explain in terms 
of theory, however, how the ‘Western’ bloc or global state bounds ‘its’ territory. Thus, his account does 
not allow for discussion of the notion of a bloc state or a global state in terms of a single state. 
Therefore, I suggest that conceiving the aforementioned quasi-global space as a politically unified 
cluster of states (hereafter referred to as the global cluster) is more appropriate.  
 
The emergence of the global cluster created the conditions for the shift from internationalization to 
globalization. But how? Internationalization, like globalization, refers to a growing interdependence 
between states. Yet the very idea of internationalization presumes that states remain discrete national 
units with clearly demarcated and mutually exclusive borders of violence.50 Thus, internationalization 
seems to capture well the effect generated by the expansion of social relations to a global scale during 
the consolidation of empires. This period, as noted before, witnessed this expansion of social relations 
to the extent that hyperglobalists and transformationalists consider it the starting point of contemporary, 
‘non-territorial’, globalization. However, according to STA’s political-militarist account of 
globalization, the expansion of social relations to a global scale during the consolidation of empires 
would not amount to more than internationalization. As Mann and others observe, the process of empire 
consolidation was accompanied by the naturalization of civil societies into nation states, ‘caged by state 
sovereignty and boundaries’. Correspondingly, an inter-imperial order emerged in which each European 
nation-state empire was a world order in its own right, exhibiting its own authority structure, trade 
regime, dominant language and culture.51 Thus, during the consolidation of empires, social relations 
might have extended to a global scale. However, ‘caged’, ‘border-power-containing’ nation-state-
empire forms, operating within an inter-imperial order, remained discrete national units with clearly 
demarcated and mutually exclusive borders of violence. Therefore, the expansion of social relations 
could not have amounted to more than internationalization.  
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Hence, for globalization to emerge, a change in the political structure of social relations was required. 
Such a shift would entail problematizing the national discreteness of states separated by demarcated and 
mutually exclusive borders of violence, which characterized the nation-state-empire form and its 
corresponding international order. The replacement of the nation-state-empire form by the global 
cluster generated that effect; it eliminated borders of violence between states and prompted the pooling 
and coordination of authority and the use of political force in a range of international institutions. 
Consequently, a politically unified global statist layer emerged, eroding the national discreteness of 
states and their clear demarcation through mutually exclusive borders of violence. In the process, to 
paraphrase Mann, states were ‘uncaged’, and driven to reducing the ‘statization’ of their economies, 
societies and cultures.52 As a result, the expansion of social relations to a global scale through the 
activities of private, sub-state and supra-state entities, was taking place within a politically unified 
social space. Under these conditions, and unlike the period of empire consolidation, the expansion of 
social relations to a global scale developed beyond internationalization, setting in motion contemporary 
globalization. Hence, my earlier definition of globalization as a multi dimensional contested process 
which involves the increasing embedding of political, military, economic, social, and cultural activities 
in politically unified (quasi)global spheres of activity.  
 
In exploring STA’s military-political account of the rise of contemporary globalization I do not attempt 
to provide a historical account of the interfacing of international politics and globalization. Rather, the 
aim is to show how STA might conceptualize international politics as contributing to both globalization 
and fragmentation. This conceptualization is pertinent to theorizing foreign policy in the context of GT; 
as a constitutive element of international politics—identified as contributing to both globalization and 
fragmentation—foreign policy shapes the interfacing between globalization and international politics.  
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Israel’s globalization and foreign policy towards the PLO 1973-1988, through the 
STA lens 
 
The previous section challenged the exclusion of foreign policy from GT. It demonstrated that, in 
providing a political-militarist account of contemporary globalization, a space is opened for including 
foreign policy into GT. In so doing, foreign policy is rendered one of many factors inducing and 
reproducing globalization; an activity that shapes the mutually constitutive relationship between 
globalization and the state; and a factor shaping the interfacing between international politics and 
globalization. These findings will inform the second part of the article, which uses STA to examine the 
interfacing between globalization and foreign policy in the case of Israel. However, before our heuristic 
examination of the case of Israel begins, some account of Israeli-PLO relations during the 1973-1988 
period, is useful. The military and political outcomes of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war transformed the 
political landscape; among other things, it allowed the emergence of the PLO as an independent 
political actor in the Arab-Israeli conflict. By the early 1970s, the PLO had established itself in Lebanon 
as what Sayigh terms a ‘state in exile’. The statist attributes of the PLO consisted of a non-extractive 
financial base comprised of contributions from the Gulf States and donations from around the world; an 
elaborate bureaucratic apparatus providing social services to the Palestinians;53 and a ‘state within a 
state’ consolidated in South Lebanon, and used by the PLO for military operations against Israel.54  
The growing international recognition of the PLO was another important attribute of the state in exile: 
the Arab League Summit in Rabat in October 1974 recognized the PLO as the sole, legitimate 
representative of the Palestinian people, despite objections from Jordan. In September 1974, President 
Podgornyi of the USSR supported the creation of a Palestinian state and in the same year a PLO office 
opened in Moscow; in 1978 the USSR again endorsed the PLO’s sole representation of the Palestinians 
and in 1981 granted the organization full diplomatic status. Although the relationship between the PLO 
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and the USSR was rife with tensions and disagreements, the organization was increasingly seen as an 
ally of the USSR.55  
 
The 6 June 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon dealt the PLO’s state in exile a heavy blow. It lost its 
territorial base and the bulk of its military equipment. In spring 1983, the politically enfeebled PLO 
leadership faced an internal revolt, which was supported by Syria and partially backed by Libya.56 It 
was not until the outbreak of the first Palestinian Intifadah, in November 1987, that the PLO was able to 
regain its political ground. Although initially taken by surprise, the PLO quickly ‘captured’ the 
Intifadah politically, establishing the political base necessary for re-engagement in the international 
arena as an independent actor.57  
 
Israel adopted a two-pronged foreign policy towards the PLO during this tumultuous period. It sought 
to politically marginalize the organization through diplomatic engagement with the Arab states, most 
notably Egypt and Jordan.58 Concurrently, it was attempting to eliminate the PLO politically and 
militarily through its use of intensive military force. Employing the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) directly 
against the PLO and using the Lebanese Maronites as a proxy, this policy reached its peak in the 1982 
Israeli invasion of Lebanon.59 Although scaled down after the Lebanon war, Israel’s military force 
remained a key tenet of its foreign policy. Israel’s attacks on the PLO’s military compound in Tunis on 
1 October 1985, and the assassination of the PLO’s second in command, Abu Jihad, in his home in 
Tunis on 16 April 1988, are examples.60 
 
i. Foreign policy-inducing and advancing military and political globalization 
 
The conditions that enabled the interfacing of Israel’s foreign policy towards the PLO and 
globalization, materialized in the political and military aftermath of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. Two 
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events during the war illustrate that in the political and military context of the Cold War, Israel no 
longer had the capacity, assumed after the 1967 war, to ‘go it alone’. These events were the US airlift, 
which enabled the Israeli counter-offensive that reversed the course of the war in its favour, and the 
worldwide alert issued by the US in the final two days of the war to deter the USSR from intervening 
on the sides of Egypt and Syria.61  
 
Subsequently, Israeli governments were keen to consolidate strategic relationships with the US. The 
Labour government, under the leadership of Yitzhak Rabin, insisted that a ‘memorandum of agreement’ 
(MOA) between Israel and the US be signed as part of the Sinai II agreement with Egypt (arranging the 
redeployment of Israeli forces in the Sinai in 1975). Later, the Likud government, under the leadership 
of Menachem Begin, insisted that as part of the Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement, this MOA should be 
upgraded. Another opportunity to cement strategic relationships was afforded by Ronald Reagan’s 
ascent to the US presidency in November 1980. Whilst the Carter administration had viewed 
international relations from a regional perspective, the Reagan administration’s view was global, and its 
foreign policy was set within the context of the dynamics of the Cold War. Within this matrix Israel 
was considered a ‘formidable strategic asset’,62 reflected in the memorandum of understanding on 
strategic cooperation signed on 30 November 1981 by the two states. This memorandum was suspended 
after Israel annexed the Golan in 1981, but was reactivated in 1983.63 
 
The significance of these memoranda for this article lies not so much in the political, military and 
economic support they guaranteed to Israel, but in their globalizing effects. Prior to their signing, Israel 
could only obtain secondary and tertiary alliances, that is, bonds that ensured a continuing and adequate 
flow of weapons and strategic materials and that coordinated Israel’s efforts to contain Arab states 
through the parallel efforts of other powers. Israel’s earlier alliances with France and the Kennedy 
administration exemplify this.64 However, in terms of the STA approach suggested here, the deepening 
strategic relationship with the US after 1973 cannot be perceived as a mere secondary or tertiary 
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alliance. As mentioned earlier, a global statist layer was constituted by a raft of international institutions 
as well as bilateral and multilateral alliances, in which monopoly over the means of violence was 
pooled among the states comprising the global cluster. Also, borders of violence were collapsed. Thus, 
by embedding Israel into the global cluster, the strategic memoranda effectively induced Israel’s 
military and political globalization. Israel’s military and political incorporation into the global state 
layer was clearly reflected by its agreement to employ the IDF for missions unrelated to the defence of 
Israel, which followed the description of the USSR in Israeli official documents as a confrontation 
state.65 Israel, therefore, like other states within the global cluster, did not retain its monopoly over use 
of the means of violence. Rather, Israel pooled the state’s authority and use of legitimate political force 
within the global cluster, at least as far as their use in the external sphere was concerned, thereby 
becoming embedded politically and militarily.  
 
ii. Foreign policy, de-statization, and the reproduction of globalization 
 
The political and military globalization of Israel through the use of foreign policy, was predicated on 
and produced transformations to the Israeli state. This produced a second globalizing effect, with 
significant implications for the political edifice upon which the Israeli state was predicated since its 
establishment in 1948, namely, Mamlachtiyut. Mamlachtiyut was developed by Israel’s first prime-
minister, David Ben-Gurion, and his party Mapai, to fend off social and political domestic challenges. 
But, also Mamlachtiyut portrayed the state as the epitome of Jewish historical revival, elevating the 
state to the level of a supreme symbol and rendering its institutions the focus for loyalty and 
identification, endowing it with an aura of supreme political universality with interests beyond politics. 
Hence, as long as Mamlachtiyut remained intact Israel’s political, military, economic, and cultural 
landscapes would remain predominantly statist, as it was difficult for competing actors and forces—
external or internal—to impinge on the now venerated state.66   
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Following the blow dealt to the Israeli state by the 1973 war blunder, social groups, especially those 
that hitherto were alienated by Mamlachtiyut, such as National-Religious and Mizrachi Jews, were now 
forthcoming in challenging the state and the political edifice upon which it was predicated. Their protest 
swiftly transformed into a political force with the first ever victory of the right-wing Likud party in the 
1977 national elections, unravelling Mamlachtiyut from below.67  
 
Yet, more important for our discussion was Mamlachtiyut’s unravelling from above. In advancing 
Israel’s political and military embeddedness in the global cluster consecutive governments—Labour 
and Likud—were transmitting (perhaps unwittingly) a radical political message: embedding political 
and military activity in global spheres would come at the expense of organizing them around the totem 
of the state. In terms of the STA approach adopted in this article, this act is significant in creating the 
political conditions for implanting other areas of activity into these global arenas. Specifically, as noted 
earlier, as states became increasingly embedded in the global cluster, so they reduced the ‘statization’ of 
their economies, societies and cultures. Hence, the process of state clustering undermined the political 
barriers constraining the rise of globalization imposed by the organization of these activities around the 
state.   
 
A number of trends, especially in the Israeli written media, exemplify how the de-statization of Israeli 
society and culture reflected and advanced political and military embedding in the global cluster, and 
the role of foreign policy in it.68  Early examples include opinions and editorials from journalists, such 
as Yonatan Gefen and Ahraon Bachar. Their ‘op-eds’, which appeared mainly in the Israeli 
broadsheets, encompassed the key norms of the new American left, such as liberty, sexual promiscuity 
and a yearning for ‘peace’ in Israeli society and culture. In addition, inspired by the ‘new journalism’, 
and the New-Yorker magazine in particular, there was a reduction in the cumbersome statist Zionist 
terminology that had been common in newspapers, and a substitution by a more casual, colloquial and 
communicative use of Hebrew.  
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The embedding of ‘selected’ norms and attributes reflecting the growing impact of globalization at the 
expense of Mamlachtiyut, expanded dramatically with the publication of numerous new journals and 
metropolitan newspapers. The most influential (and typical) of these was the journal Monitin,69 which 
was published between 1978 and 1994 and drew its inspiration primarily from Esquire, the New-Yorker 
magazine and Rolling Stone. Although also dealing with local Israeli issues, Monitin  had a clear global 
agenda, focusing on global economic issues (mainly stock exchange and business news), eccentric 
social and cultural trends, and leisure activities. 
 
There were several messages implicit in this content. First, the Monitin reader is a man/woman of the 
world, concerned primarily with laissez-faire. Second, Monitin was the first significant publication in 
the printed media, to systematically question the socioeconomic and cultural foundations of 
Mamlachtiyut. It thus established a stage that presented and legitimated a very different way of 
conducting everyday life. Individualism, consumerism, hedonism and a connection to the global social 
and cultural spheres of activity surrounding the global cluster, became the vogue. These themes shifted 
the emphasis of Mamlachtiyut on the state and the collective, to the individual. Third, in writing about 
issues outside of Israel the Zionist ethos as formulated by Mamlachtiyut, was eroded. In sociocultural 
terms, Zionism conceived of the ‘outside’ as the ‘exile’ in which Israelis- and Jews more generally-had 
no place. On the other hand, the coverage given to the outside world by Monitin, made it a desirable 
sociocultural sphere, which Israelis were encouraged to explore.70 The message conveyed by Monitin 
and other journals was reinforced by Israeli television- and particularly the import of several American 
and British television series, e.g., Angle, Hawaii 5-0, Colombo, Starsky and Hutch, Love Boat, and 
Dallas among many others. Such programmes and the themes they represented, increasingly began to 
occupy everyday conversations. Their protagonists, the main actors, and the norms they encapsulated, 
became part of Israeli social and cultural life.71  
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Thus, Israel’s political and military embedding in the global cluster was reflected and advanced by the 
de-statization of Israeli culture and society, unravelling Mamlachtiyut from above.  
 
What were the implications of this for Israeli foreign policy towards the PLO? Many of the Israeli 
intelligentsia and most decision-makers in the Israeli media read metropolitan magazines and journals 
such as Monitin, resulting in an influential part of society increasingly eager to adopt a selected set of 
economic, social and cultural norms at the expense of those promoted by Mamlachtiyut. This social 
group aspired to joining the sociocultural sphere to which it was being introduced. Israel’s hard-line 
foreign policy towards the PLO steadily became a political impediment to these aspirations. It 
reinforced the militaristic aspects of Mamlachtiyut, at the expense of the individualistic, bourgeois, 
capitalist, Western way of life and also attracted critique from the ranks of Western civil society, 
thereby reducing the Israeli intelligentsia’s ability to become an integral part of the broader Western 
sociocultural milieu. Through the 1970s and 1980s this social constituency consolidated into a 
capitalist-liberal-globally oriented elite, promoting an ethos that challenged Mamlachtiyut’s social, 
cultural and economic foundations in favour of sociocultural globalization. This elite became a major 
force in creating the environment accommodating Rabin’s government argument later in the 1990s that 
peace with the PLO and globalization were inextricably interlinked and crucial for Israel’s future.72   
 
 
iii. Foreign policy and social relations along the globalization-international political interface  
 
I now examine how, in becoming intrinsic to, and formative of, the interfacing between globalization 
and the international politics of the Cold War, Israeli foreign policy prompted the expansion of social 
relations in the form of military exports. Military exports are appropriate to this discussion because, as 
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McGrew observes, ‘studies of globalization have given little more than passing attention to the subject 
of organized violence’.73  
 
It was after the 1967 war that military exports emerged as a foreign policy tool and a source of 
economic revenue. Previously, Israel had obtained its key weapons systems from European countries, 
especially France.74 However, France withheld crucial weapons shipments to Israel on the eve of the 
1967 war, and imposed a full weapons embargo in 1969, and Europe generally scaled down or stopped 
weapon deliveries to Israel. This occurred against the backdrop of renewed hostilities between Israel 
and Egypt—which was being re-armed by the USSR—during the 1969-1970 War of Attrition. 
Weapons supplies and grants ear-marked for Israel’s defence requirements from the US softened the 
blow dealt by Europe, but had conditions attached. The US refused to deliver the most advanced 
weapons systems, and provisions to Israel were often linked to US policy goals in the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, which meant they often were intermittent. Ultimately, the US’s conditional support and the 
ebbing of supplies from Europe pushed Israel to seek independence in weapons production by 
expanding its own weapons industry.75  
 
This expansion between 1967 and 1973 was also driven by domestic trends. A growing number of 
retired IDF officers assumed key positions in the military industries, and those in civilian industry 
positions, began to move to military production. Several retired army generals also took up positions in 
Israel’s political, economic, and financial elites. Their growing presence in the military and civilian 
industry sectors, and among Israel’s elite helped the expansion of the weapons industry through 
pressure on the IDF to increase purchases of indigenously produced weapons systems.76    
 
Israel’s military production expansion in 1967-1973 is reflected in several indicators: demand from 
local industry, especially metals and electronics, which grew by some 86%;77 number of defence sector 
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employees, which increased from less than 10% of the total labour force in 1967 to 19% in 1973;78 and 
the significant growth in Israel’s arsenal of weapons, witness the launch of the Merkava tank and Kfir 
fighter jet projects.79 The shift to producing these large-scale weapons systems increased the need for 
scale economies in the defence industry, in which increased military exports between 1967 and 1973 
from $39 to $70 million was crucial.80  
 
Although the weapons industry developed significantly in the 1967-1973 period, this expansion was 
substantially smaller than occurred between 1973 and the mid 1980s, suggesting the addition of other 
fuelling factors. One such was the international politics of the Cold War, which provided the context for 
Israel to use defence exports to support governments allied to the global cluster, but threatened 
politically by the USSR and its allies.81 These included, for example,  El Salvador, Honduras and Costa 
Rica in Central America, and the former Zaire in Africa. Israel helped Zaire to build a security force to 
support its invasion of Chad to prevent a political take-over by insurgents backed by Libya and 
equipped with Soviet arms.82 Little information on these operations is publicly available; however, the 
evidence that can be gleaned through academic research in this field suggests that the military and 
political embedding of the Israeli state into the global cluster and military exports became mutually 
reinforcing. Ariel Sharon, while holding the defence portfolio, decreed that Israel’s strategic and 
security interests would be met by ‘an active effort to increase our [military] export to countries who 
share our strategic concerns and with whom we maintain security relationships’. An authoritative 
observer contends that, ‘this is as clear a statement of direction on arms policy as one finds from an 
authoritative Israeli source’.83  
 
The advancement of Israel’s political and military globalization through the expansion of military 
exports was interlinked with a second factor fuelling the expansion of the weapons industry: the 
economic rewards deriving from the burgeoning global market for military products. In world-wide 
terms, arms transfers more than doubled in 1969 to 1978, increasing from $9.4 to $19.1 billion (in 
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constant dollars). In the 1970s alone, demand from developing countries for weapons surged by 
300%.84 Israel’s access to the global military products market was limited by its conflict with the Arab 
states. Notwithstanding, the scale of global demand allowed it to establish a niche and its military 
exports grew from 15% of total industrial exports in 1973, to approximately 25% in the mid 1980s. 
Concurrently, employment in the defence sector increased from 19% to 25% of the Israeli labour force, 
or half of all industry workers. The defence industry also indirectly created jobs in the form of a 
network of financial, legal, auditing and commercial business services.85 The volume of sales and the 
amounts of foreign direct investment from US multinational companies (GTE, CTC, McDonnell 
Douglas, etc.) in the Israeli defence industry rendered it the chief foreign currency generator.86 Thus, 
Israel’s first economic dividends from global trade were based on military products. As the export of 
military products was closely linked to Israel’s aspirations to advance its embeddedness in the global 
cluster, it is suggested that expanding social relations through military exports, developed across the 
interface between globalization and the international politics of the Cold War.87  
 
In this context, Israel’s hard-line stance towards the PLO and its defence industry expansion became 
mutually reinforcing. The important trend was Israel’s constant scaling-up of military force in the mid 
1970s, .e.g. the Litani operation in 1978, and culminating in the June 1982 invasion of Lebanon.88 This 
upsurge in the use of force helped to consolidate the defence industry in a number of ways: it was a 
source of revenue; it elevated the defence industry among the economic sectors that received state 
support based on their vital importance for national security; and successful deployment of Israeli 
defence industry products by the IDF on the battlefield was good advertisement and marketing. This 
buttressing of the defence industries, in turn, increased Israel’s ability to use its military products as a 
foreign policy tool to grab the political, economic and military opportunities presented by the 
globalization-international politics interface in the Cold War.  
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It is significant that from the mid 1970s negotiations with Egypt got underway and the security 
arrangements put in place along the borders with Jordan and Syria following the 1973 war, remained. 
Thus, foreign policy in relation to the PLO became Israel’s main arena for extensive and routine use  of 
military force, reinforcing the synergistic relationship between strengthening its defence industry and 
capturing the opportunities presented by the social relations along the globalization-international 
politics interface. This is not to imply that the defence industry was lobbying for the predication of 
Israel’s strength on the intensive use of military force, but rather to demonstrate a material connection 
between expansion of Israel’s defence industry, foundation of Israel’s foreign policy towards the PLO 
on the intensive use of force, and expansion of social relations on the interface between globalization 
and international politics.  
 
Conclusion 
This article has sought to engage with, and make a contribution to, the emerging second great debate on 
globalization by examining what including foreign policy in GT might entail. Based on an exploration 
of various works critiquing contemporary GT, the first section of the article suggested STA as an 
alternative approach to the hyper-globalist and transformationalist theses of globalization. STA is 
grounded in a political-military account of globalization and demonstrates that it is possible for GT to 
incorporate foreign policy without subordinating it in terms of ontology, to global forces. Informed by 
STA, the second section examined the relationship between the military and political globalization of 
Israel and its foreign policy. It was shown that the military and political crisis during the 1973 Arab-
Israeli war prompted Israeli governments to pursue a foreign policy of military and political 
globalization. The coincidence of these changes with the intra-systemic dynamics of the Cold War 
spawned the rise of globalization into a constitutive factor of Israeli foreign policy. Israel’s political and 
military embedding in the global cluster, and expanding social relations through foreign policy across 
the interface between globalization and the international politics of the Cold War, reinforced its hard-
line stance towards the PLO.  
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The globalization and foreign policy interfacing was predicated on and produced changes in the state, 
setting in motion Israel’s de-statization. The sociocultural tenets of Mamlachtiyut were renegotiated: 
journals, such as Monitin, and Israel’s single state-run TV channel, portrayed the outside socio-cultural 
space as one that Israelis should explore and be exposed to, thereby undermining the Zioinist notion of 
negating the exile, and enabling the socio-cultural forces of globalization to challenge the hitherto 
dominant political edifice of Mamlachtiyut. Thus, from the early 1970s Israel’s ability to operate as an 
organized centre of violence, the composition and performance of its economy, and the growing impact 
of imported social and cultural norms were imprinted with globalization.  
 
The case of Israel was used heuristically to expose more specifically how including foreign policy in 
GT might better our understanding of globalization, foreign policy, and the relationship between them.  
The findings presented above contradict what the hyper-globalist and transformationalist theses would 
expect. Neither economic nor spatio-temporal elements were identified as inducing and reproducing 
Israel’s globalization in its early stages. Rather, Israel’s military and political globalization, and the 
ensuing un-caging of its society and culture, was prompted by a confluence multiple foreign policy 
activities: the memoranda with the US, the global export of military products, and the enduring hard-
line stance towards the PLO. Moreover, against the backdrop of the international politics of the Cold 
War, foreign policy was used as a key site of political action by the Israeli state to capture the 
opportunities and resist the challenges generated by globalization.   
 
In sum, while fully recognizing the limitations of using one case study, this article underscores four 
themes that might prove useful for the debate on how including foreign policy in GT would benefit our 
understanding of globalization, foreign policy, and the relationship between them.  The first concerns 
the forces and activities inducing globalization. We have shown how foreign policy, in being a 
boundary activity, can generate the dynamics of globalization even in the absence of spatio-temporal 
compression or economic integration into global activity. It would be useful to investigate more deeply 
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the contexts where foreign policy might induce globalization. The second involves how, why, and 
under what conditions states use foreign policy to respond to the challenges and opportunities presented 
by globalization.  The third concerns the impact of globalization on foreign policy behaviour, which, in 
the case of Israel was dialectical. On the one hand, embedding in the global cluster and the interfacing 
between globalization and the Cold War, reinforced Israel’s hard-line stance towards the PLO; on the 
other, the unravelling of Mamlacthtiyut from above by the globalization of culture and society produced 
an alternative ethos challenging this hard-line stance. The fourth direction is over the mutually 
constitutive relationship between globalization and the state, and the role in it of foreign policy.  
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